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Dividend decisions is a type of policy that earnings should be distributed to shareholders and 
sometimes contrast with the interest by insiders whether to retain or reinvest. The objective of 
this study is to examine the determinants of dividend policy on 230 listed firms in period of 
2010 to 2011 and conducts logistic regression for hypothesis testing. This study finds that 
profitability, firm size, and institutional ownership are significant to dividend policy while 
managerial ownership is insignificant. This findings indicate that most of listed firms of the 
sample of this study determine the dividend policy based on profits. This study also finds that 
more larger the firms or institutional ownership then they tend to increase the dividends. 
Limited to sample, this study proves that agency theory is not applicable for dividend policy 
in Indonesia as the managerial ownership have no relationship with the dividend policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Dividend is the other form of firm profits which distributed by firms to the 
shareholders. There are many reasons why companies choose to pay dividends or not. Some 
companies choose to turn profits into dividends, but there are also companies that choose to 
invest from income earned. The actual motivation of the company paying the dividends is 
unclear. 
 This study aims to find the factors that affect the financial dividends in companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Furthermore, whether there is a relationship 
between the characteristics of different financial connection with the company pays dividends 
or not? What factors are affecting the dividend payment strategy? The study also sought to 
explore which of the dividend policy theories that explain the behavior of such dividends. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Dividend irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961) states that firm value 
and shareholder wealth of the decision beruhubungan not have to pay dividends or not. 
Shareholders can hold its own "homemade", if the company does not pay a dividend, the 
shareholder can sell the shares and make homemade dividends. Brigham and Houston (2004) 
clarify that if firm pays more dividend then shareholders will elect to use an excess of 
dividends to purchase additional shares. Both of these arguments underlining assumption of 
the irrelevance hypothesis, where this argument stating that there is no distinction between 
capital gains and dividends. This makes the shareholders do not want to pay high prices for 
stocks with high dividends. 
 The recent studies provide evidences that dividend irrelevance theory is not based on 
perfect capital market. The results of different empirical studies present evidences that the 
dividend distribution normally relevant to value and wealth of firm shareholders. One of the 
assumptions is the bird in hand theory which suggested by Lintner (1956).  Lintner (1956) 
states that dividend is positively link to value of firms. Investors will invest in stocks that pay 
dividends at this time than to invest in stocks with retained earnings and pay dividends in the 




future. This argument is based on the high degree of uncertainty with respect to capital gains 
and dividends paid in the future. Dividends paid today is more predictable than capital gains, 
since the stock price is determined by the market and not by the manager, this is what makes 
the high level of uncertainty. However, Gordon (1962) states that based on the rationale that 
the more distant future, the higher the level of uncertainty with respect to capital gains and 
dividends. Capital gains in the future could present a high return over the dividend payment 
date, there is no guarantee that investors will accumulate a high return in relation to the high 
degree of uncertainty. 
 Signaling theory is a theory which states the relationship between the dividend by the 
stock price. Bhattacharya (1979) says that dividends serve as a signal of future cash flows. 
Although there are no tax benefits on dividends, the company will choose to pay dividends in 
order to provide a positive signal to shareholders and outside shareholders. Bhattacharya 
assumes that investors have perfect information with respect to dividends and capital gains, 
as well as higher taxes on dividends than capital gains. Baker (2009) says that the resources 
companies such as accounting data and reports future prospects are not fully reliable because 
it does not depict the company's profitability in the future. Therefore, investors have 
imperfect information with respect to the company's profit, the company must find another 
way to reassure foreign investors about the cash flow and future earnings. The increase in 
dividend payments is one signal to investors, even if the dividends taxed higher than capital 
gains, investors are willing to pay higher taxes on dividends to replace it with a positive 
signal of dividends with respect to the value of the shares. 
 Another theory is the agency theory. Rozeff (1982) examines the relationship between 
dividend payments and corporate factors. The results of the study suggested a link between 
the number of shareholders with dividend payments. According to Rozeff (1982), the firms 
with ownership of large external shareholders have to pay high dividends to reduce agency 
conflict. These results indicate that there is a negative relationship between payment diiden 
with risk, insider ownership and growth. While the dividend payment of insider ownership 
has a negative relationship, because of the presence of large shareholdings by insiders, the 
company does not have to pay high dividends. Additionally, Rozeff (1982) suggests that 
possibility of future growth have an impact on the dividend growth compared to the past that 
have been realized. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs are costs 
incurred between the principals (stockholders), and agents (management). Where principals 
hiring and delegating agent with the goal of maximizing the welfare of principals. Only the 
stock and debt that can be used as a claim against the company. However, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) do not present strong evidence with respect to the effects of agency costs on 
dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984) to test whether dividend payments could be used to 
minimize the agency costs that occur between managers and investors. There are two factors 
that affect a company's agency costs, monitoring costs and risk aversion preferences of 
managers. 
 Another theory that explains the agency costs is free cash flow as suggested by Jensen 
(1986). Jensen (1986) clarifies that agency costs arise as the increase in free cash flow 
because shareholders have to supervise to prevent managers of businesses increase 
investment spending and unfavorable. Similarly, Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) confirm that 
ratio of equity dividend payments by firms is higher than levered firms that constitute the 
control group. Further equity firms, with low managerial ownership is high paying dividends. 
Overall dividends and managerial ownership is a substitute mechanism to reduce agency 
costs on equity firms. The studies of Pruitt and Gitman (1991), Fama and French (2000), Al-
Kuwar (2009), and Al-Malkawi, Twairesh, and Harery (2013) provide evidences that 
profitability has a significant relationship with the payment dividends. Firm size is one of the 
factors that determine the dividend payment as confirmed by Redding (1997), Al-Kuwari 
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(2009), Shubiri (2011), and Mehta (2012). Based on those review, the hypothesis of this 
study are as follows: 
Ha1: Profitability have a significant effect on dividend policy  
Ha2: The size companies have a significant effect on dividend policy  
Ha3: Institutional ownership significant effect on dividend policy  
Ha4: Managerial ownership significant effect on dividend policy 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 This study used data from audited financial statement provide by Indonesia Stock 
Exchange over period of 2010 to 2011. Table 1 presents the sample of this study. This study 
selects the sample by uses purposive sampling method and get 230 firms with 460 as total 
observation. 
 




Basic industry and chemical 56 
Miscellaneous Industry  39 
Trade, Services & Investment 92 
 Total 230 
 
 The dependent variable of this study is dividend policy which measured by dummy 
where 1 is for firms who pay dividends and otherwise is 0. The independent variables of this 
study are profitability, firm size, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership. 
Profitability is the ability of the company makes a profit in relation to sales, total assets and 
own capital. Profitability is measured by using the return on assets and calculated by ratio of 
net income over total assets. The size of firms is based on total assets held and measured by 
natural logarithm of total assets. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by 
institutional owners and ownership by a blockholder, such as ownership of the individual or 
on behalf of individuals in the top 5 percent but not included in group of insider ownership. 
This study measures institutional ownership as percentage of number of shares held by 
institusional over outstanding shares. Managerial ownership is ownership by the management 
of the board of commissioners and directors who took possession of managerial decisions. 
This study measures managerial ownership as percentage of number of shares held by insider 
over outstanding shares. This study conducts logistic regression and assess its fit model as 
suggested by Ghozali (2009) and notes the model for hypothesis testing as follow: 
Ddummy = β0 + βROA+  βSize + βIns + βMan 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and shows that profitability as measured by 
ROA has a minimum value of -132.03, 341.56 maximum values, average and standard 
deviation 7.4043 25.46743. Size or the size of the company has a minimum value of 8.00, the 
maximum value of 19:00, an average of 13.7848, standard deviation of 1.95131. Institutional 
ownership is represented by midnight Inst has a minimum value, maximum value of 0.99, an 
average of 0.4217 and a standard deviation of 0.36613. As for Managerial ownership is 
denoted by 0:00 Man having a minimum value, maximum value of 0:36, an average of 
0.0062, standard deviation of 0.03697. 
 
 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ROA 460 -132.03 341.56 7.4043 25.46743 
Size 460 8.00 19.00 13.7848 1.95131 
Inst 460 0.00 0.99 0.4217 0.36613 
Man 460 0.00 0.36 0.0062 0.03697 
 
Table 3 presents the model fit test. The test results shows the Chi-square of 14.974 with a 
significant probability value of 0.060> 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. This means that 
the regression model feasible for use in subsequent analyzes, because there is no real 
difference between the predicted classification by classification were observed. On this result, 
the model of this study is able to predict the value of observation. 
 
Table 3. Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 14.974 8 0.060 
 
Table 4 shows that Nagelkerke's of R Square is equal to 0.309 which means that the 
variability of the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables is 
30.9% and the remains is explained by the variability of variables which outside of the model 
of this study. 
 










 0.174 0.309 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than 0 .001. 
 
4.2.Discussion 
 Table 5 presents the result of logistic regression where ROA, Size, and Institutional 
are significant at 0.05 while Managerial is insignificant.  
 
Table 5. Result of logistic regression 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -12.768 1.620 62.132 1 0.000 0.000 
ROA 0.016 0.005 10.476 1 0.001 1.016 
Size 0.655 0.098 44.438 1 0.000 1.926 
Inst 2.514 0.522 23.168 1 0.000 12.351 
Man 5.551 3.018 3.383 1 0.066 257.546 
 
 Wald test of ROA is 10.476, the probability is significant at 0.001 <α = 0:05. Positive 
direction indicates that the higher the ROA will increase the likelihood of dividend payments. 
This suggests the hypothesis Ha1 accepted. The results are consistent with the theory that if 
there is an increase ROA then dividend payout ratio will be higher. High ROA shows a 
company's ability to pay high dividends. A positive sign in this study is consistent with the 
theory or the information content signaling hypothesis, Modigliani and Miller (1961) states 
that the dividend increase is a signal to investors that management foresees a good income in 
the future, based on the theory shows that income high through-owned assets are reflected in 
the return on assets (ROA) showed a positive effect on dividend policy as reflected in the 
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dividend payout ratio (DPR). La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) state that 
shareholders would take the cash dividend from the profit of the company. This study 
supports the research of Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), Han and Suk (1999) and Fama and 
French (2000). 
 Wald test of firm size is 44.438, the probability is significant at 0.000 <α = 0:05. 
Positive direction indicates that the greater the size of the company will raise the possibility 
of a dividend payment. This suggests the hypothesis Ha2 accepted. The results of this study 
support the agency costs theory which states that for a large company have a broad 
distribution of ownership, has a good deal of control where the implication is reduced agency 
cost. Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1995) and Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) says that an 
established company will have easy access to the capital market to raise funds at lower costs, 
while the company's new and young to be have many difficulties to have access to capital 
markets. This leads to large companies tend to give higher dividends rather than small 
companies, because smaller companies have a tendency to result in fewer profits, Fama and 
French (1995). This study supports the research of Redding (1997) and Al-Makawi (2007). 
 Wald test of Institutional is 23.168, the probability is significant at 0.000 <α = 0:05. 
Positive direction indicates that the higher the Institutional ownership will raise the 
possibility of a dividend payment. This suggests the hypothesis HA3 accepted. This study 
supports the theory of free cash flow, where ownership structure of the company will result in 
a relatively diverse limited ability of owners to monitor and control of the manager would 
eventually refers to what is called the free cash flow. Payment of dividends is one of the 
primary control mechanism whereby shareholders can reduce the manager access or misuse 
of corporate funds, Jensen (1986). Institutional ownership prefer to force companies to pay 
high dividends in order for managers seeking external funding sources compared to the direct 
supervision of the manager. This study supports the studies of Han et al. (1999), and Short et 
al. (2001). 
 Wald test of managerial is 3383, the significance of the 0066 probability> α = 0:05 
showed no significant effect of managerial ownership on the variable dividend payments. 
This shows Ha4 hypothesis is rejected. These results contradict the theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) states that the separation of ownership and control of the company will 
result in a conflict of interest between shareholders and management. The impact will 
increase in line with the wishes of the management to increase the prosperity of themselves. 
When the proportion of managerial ownership increased, the interests of shareholders and 
management started to become one it will result in a decrease in dividend payments. The 
interpretation is because the managerial ownership in Indonesia is relatively small, the 
descriptive statistics has an average rating of 0.0062, this lead to the managerial ownership 
has no connection with the dividend policy.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 This study concludes that profitability, firm size and institutional ownership 
significantly influence the profitability dividen. Relates to dividend distribution, it can be 
interpreted that companies listed on the Stock Exchange largely basing its dividend payment 
on the company's profitability. The size of the company can explain the company's decision 
in the decision whether to pay dividends or not. The larger the company, the greater the 
probability of the company paying the dividend. The higher the level of institutional 
ownership in a company, creating greater power by the institutional investors to use the 
company's profits as dividend payments and then encourage managers to seek funding from 
outside the company. Managerial ownership has no significant relationship to the company's 
decision to pay dividends or not, because the portion of managerial ownership in companies 
in Indonesia are very small. 




 The relationship between the variables ROA, size, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership is based on the theory relating to dividend policy. The decision to pay 
dividends or not the companies listed on the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in accordance with the signaling theory, free cash flow and agency theory. Future 
studies should use a larger sample to increase the validity of data. Samples should compare 
between sectors of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange, for example, between the 
base and the chemical industry sector with the financial sector. This analysis can identify 
sectors where the most low and high in terms of dividend payments. For the development of 
further research, we recommend the addition of a variable that could explain the company's 
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